Speech by Kaveh L. Afrasiabi at Foreign Affairs Symposium, Johns Hopkins University (April 1, 2008)
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,

The international dimensions of Iran's nuclear standoff represent a ripe topic for inquiry not only about Iran but also about the non-proliferation regime and even the United Nations, in light of the UN Security Council's impositions of sanctions on Iran that carry significant ramifications for the future of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the twin subjects of disarmament and non-proliferation.
For the students of international affairs in particular, the question of contextualization of the Iran nuclear "crisis" and how to delineate the main contours of this crisis within a sound theoretical framework is, indeed, a vexing one, given the confluence of global and regional power relations, the global dynamic of (counter) proliferation, and the internal (domestic) Iranian considerations that certainly weigh heavy on Iran's foreign policy-makers. This is not to mention the difficulties of separating out facts from fictions, empirical data from subjective extrapolations of Iranian "intentions" and or "ambitions," and, notwithstanding the controversies swirling around the US intelligence's findings on Iran, distinguishing between what is passed on as intelligence versus pseudo-intelligence, disinformation, and pure propaganda. Even the definition of this subject as a "crisis" is problematic and depending on one's interpretation of its meaning, implications, and potential, particularly for triggering a military confrontation, the use of term "crisis" may or may not seem appropriate, again raising the issue of how to go beyond the popular discourse and make sense of this issue from within the prism of prevailing perspectives and or paradigms in international relations.
By all accounts, this is a huge task and represents a formidable challenge both for academic and policy purposes, requiring a careful and disinterested analysis that would be immune from the political fallout of on-going debates about Iran's nuclear program: Is it entirely peaceful? Has it always been peaceful? Did Iran really stop its nuclear weapon program in 2003 as claimed by the US intelligence, or has it simply switched to "open nuclearization" by its active pursuit of an enrichment program? Is Iran "driven" toward nuclear weapons as recently maintained by the CIA Director?
Interestingly, the CIA chief's "personal view" is rather difficult to reconcile with his other view that supports the NIE report's conclusion, even though the Director of US National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, has distanced himself from the report that was released last December. A noticeable tension within the US intelligence community is discernible here that ramifies the policy circles and, most likely, will extend to the tenure of the next US president.
Simultaneously, the political, military, and security crisis in Iraq is also closely linked with the Iranian nuclear standoff as the US and Iran trade accusations against each other and confidence-building and constructive engagement between them remains an unfulfilled agenda. To the extent that the Iranian nuclear crisis has a security dimension and, given the incentive packages offered to Iran that contain references to "security guarantee" for Iran, clearly there can be no expectation of any major breakthrough on the nuclear issue so long as US and Iran are divided on the question of Iraq and regional security. By the same token, any good will generated as a result of nuclear negotiations can have serious dividends on Iraq and the future of US-Iran dialogue that is presently limited to Iraq's security. The nub of the problem, however, is the nature, goal, and objective of those negotiations, simply because it is easier to defend the idea of dialogue and negotiation in abstract than to spell out the desired, and feasible, expectations and outcomes – from a non-coerced and distortion-free "strategic dialogue."
Hypothetically, then, it may be useful to present an outline of what such a dialogue may look like and what in fact may impede it, given the net of power contests between Iran on the one hand and the US and its allies, above all Israel, on the other. As both Foucault and Habermas have rightly pointed out, albeit through their contrasting theories of power and knowledge, the parameters of political and diplomatic communication between adversaries are anchored in each side's power strategies and, hence, it would be naïve to exclude those parameters from our academic exercise.
Having said that, allow me to proceed by presenting the main outlines of Iran's positions on the nuclear issue warranting our attention, which are as follows:

(1) Iran has not breached its NPT obligations and is in good standing with the IAEA: Fact is that the IAEA has come on the side of Iran's argument that is nuclear program is peaceful and whatever the agency's lingering concerns, pertaining to certain "alleged studies," or to Iran's insistence on its right to master the nuclear fuel cycle, the dominant factor, reflected in the latest IAEA report on Iran, is about Iran's nuclear transparency and the legality of its various nuclear activities. The agency has stressed that after due diligence in inspecting Iran's facilities, it has not detected any evidence of military diversion and that it is satisfied with Iran's nuclear material accountancy reports as well as the information received about the so-called "six outstanding questions," i.e., the sources of equipment contamination, Polonium 210, Gachine mine, uranium metal, etc.
Invariably, the February 22, 2008 IAEA report on Iran resolves all those questions in favor of Iran, stating that Iran's information is consistent with its own information, and in effect, closing the book on them by declaring them "no longer outstanding." Shortly after releasing his much-anticipated report, the IAEA Director-General, Dr. Mohammad ElBaradei, stated, on March 3, 2008, that "the reason Iran was referred to the Security Council was the ambiguities related to its enrichment program in the past…and this issue is no longer outstanding."
Per the concluding paragraph of the Iran-IAEA Work plan, signed in August 2007 with the explicit support of the "5 + 1" (the UN Security Council's Permanent Five plus Germany), the Iranian nuclear file should have been brought to the "normal" status: "After the implementation of the Work Plan and the agreed modalities for resolving the outstanding issues, the implementation of the safeguards in Iran would be conducted in a routine manner."
It is beguiling of the IAEA's own standards that this did not happen and the powers that be prevented the agency from respecting the terms of its agreement with Iran, simply by throwing in the monkey wrench of last minute disinformation and a media blitz that completely overshadowed the net gains of Iran-IAEA cooperation and the vindication of Iran with respect to the "outstanding issues" that were, lest we forget, the principal grounds for referring Iran to the UN Security Council in the first place. Regarding the latter, I hasten to add that the IAEA's dispatch of Iran's dossier to the UN did not cite two important articles of the IAEA statute, XIIC and III B.4, that would trigger a report on "non-compliance." Instead, the agency confined itself to the matter of Iran's refusal to implement certain "confidence-building" measures, such as the suspension of its uranium enrichment program.

(2) Iran has faithfully implemented important aspects of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Iran: Contrary to the popular belief, Iran has not simply defied the UN Security Council resolutions and it is a sheer error to maintain that Iran's substantive reaction has been one of pure rejection. To the extent that Iran has fully cooperated with the IAEA and the agency has confirmed a successful work plan, this is tantamount to the fulfillment of the Security Council's demands for Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. Also, Iran has refrained from any uranium reprocessing activities, as confirmed by both the IAEA report and the letter of Iran's Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, to the UN Secretary General, dated March 24, 2008, and this too should be viewed as a partial compliance of Iran with the UN Security Council demands.
There is, then, tangible progress with respect to the implementation and fulfillment of the Security Council's demands that bear directly on the remaining, unfulfilled demands, above all, the enrichment activity and the construction of the heavy water reactor in Arak.
With respect to the enrichment program, suffice to say the following:

(a) Neither the NPT articles nor the statutes of the IAEA preclude Iran from the right to engage in low-grade uranium enrichment activities;
(b) The IAEA has full scope monitoring of the Natanz facility, has conducted nine "unannounced visits" there in the past few months alone, and has verified the low-ceiling of Iran's enrichment activities at or below 4%;
(c) The IAEA's robust inspection allows it detect any diversion to weapons grade enrichment, as the equipment would have to be reconfigured and assembled differently for that purpose;
(d) Iran has formally proposed a multinationalization of its enrichment program;
(e) Iran has already implemented a "confidence-building" temporary suspension in the recent past and there is no justification for any further suspension, given the considerable resources put up by the country to achieve a scientific and technological breakthrough in this area;
(f) Why shouldn't Iran produce nuclear fuel, when it has the technology, it costs less, it is environmentally safer than importing, when it can export both the product and the technology and, above all, when it lessens its foreign dependency?
(g) The end goal of suspension as requested by the UN Security Council is mired in ambiguity: does it mean permanent suspension, as yearned for by the US and its allies, notwithstanding the March 2006 letter of the current UK ambassador to the UN, John Sawers, that called for making Iran's "voluntary measures a mandatory requirement"? There is absolutely no legal foundation for this demand and the unstated goal of US and its European allies to deprive Iran of the "nuclear proliferation-prone" enrichment technology has simply occurred in a legal vacuum that belies the international law and the NPT standards.
(h) According to one school of thought in the US, Iran should suspend its enrichment program "pending negotiations," to echo the former US point man on Iran, Nicholas Burns. But as long as the US and its allies refuse to acknowledge Iran's NPT right to possess the nuclear fuel cycle, any such negotiation is fated to a failure. It is one thing to have a negotiation without preconditions and quite another to have it without the benefit of a framework set by the NPT standards and IAEA statutes.


In conclusion, given Iran's NPT rights, the IAEA's certification of the absence of any non-peaceful diversion, and prior confidence-building steps by Iran, the UN sanctions on Iran lack legitimacy and must be abandoned in favor of returning Iran's file to its proper technical and legal forum, the IAEA. This is the only path but one that may be followed by a temporary "time-out" in line with a recent proposal of the IAEA's Director-General. Any other path, i.e., coercive sanctions and other punitive measures, is a road to nowhere.